

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0049

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: FEBRUARY 13, 1975 PLENARY SESSION

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. AT THE FEB 13 PLENARY MEETING OF
THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, STATEMENTS WERE DELIVERED BY
THE CANADIAN REP (GRANDE), AND BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK REP
(KLEIN), WHO WAS PARTICIPATING IN HIS LAST PLENARY MEETING
BEFORE RETURNING TO A NEW ASSIGNMENT IN PRAGUE.

2. THE CANADIAN STATEMENT, APPROVED AT THE FEB 12
AD HOC GROUP MEETING, PRESENTED THE CASE FOR SUBSTANTIAL
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AND MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS. GRANDE THEN

USED NATO GUIDANCE IN REJECTING THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL. THE CANADIAN REP CONCLUDED BY REVIEWING THE CURRENT ALLIED POSITION AND AGAIN UNDERSCORING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLIED AIR NO-INCREASE PROPOSAL. THE TEXT OF THE CANADIAN STATEMENT WAS REPORTED BY AIRGRAM.

3. SPEAKING FIRST AT THE PLENARY MEETING, KLEIN REVIEWED THE EASTERN POSITION ALONG STANDARD LINES, ECHOING THE MAIN POINTS MADE IN THE EASTERN PRESENTATIONS AT THE JAN 30 AND FEB 6 PLENARIES, BUT IN A MORE MODERATE TONE. THE CZECHOSLOVAK REP STRESSED THE SUBSTANTIAL GOALS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS, NOTING THAT THE NOV 8, 1973 EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT PROVIDED FOR MORE THAN 15 PER CENT REDUCTIONS. KLEIN ARGUED THAT THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL WAS A LOGICAL STEP ON THE LADDER LEADING TO REDUCTIONS, AND WAS DESIGNED "TO UNDERTAKE A SERIOUS SEARCH FOR THE WAY OUT OF THE NOT VERY ENCOURAGING SITUATION IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS." KLEIN SOUGHT, IN PARAS 18-20 OF HIS STATEMENT, TO REBUT ALLIED CRITICISM OF THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL. HE CHARGED THAT, IN CONTRAST TO THE EASTERN POSITION, THE ALLIED REDUCTION PROPOSALS WERE NOT SUBSTANTIAL, BECAUSE, "FOR EXAMPLE,...NUCLEAR WARHEADS WITH THE CORRESPONDING MEANS OF DELIVERY IS LEFT OUT." FINALLY, TURNING TO WESTERN NO-INCREASE PROPOSALS, THE CZECH REP CRITICIZED ALLIED INSISTENCE ON A "LINK" BETWEEN REDUCTIONS AND A FREEZE, ASSERTING THAT THE WEST IS IN EFFECT DELIBERATELY BLOCKING NOT ONLY A SOLUTION TO THE NO-INCREASE QUESTION BUT ALSO PROGRESS TOWARD SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS. END SUMMARY.

4. THE TEXT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK STATEMENT READS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN, COMRADES AND GENTLEMEN,

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1. TODAY, BEFORE MY TRANSFER TO NEW WORK, I HAVE THE HONOUR TO SPEAK FOR THE LAST TIME AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS AS HEAD OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK DELEGATION. ALLOW ME THEREFORE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OCCASION ONCE MORE TO TAKE PART IN THE EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS WHICH, AS WE ALL HOPE, WILL IN THE END LEAD TO CONCRETE DECISIONS AND AGREEMENTS. IF WE WERE TO SUCCEED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR THIS EXIST, THEN I THINK THIS WOULD BE THE BEST GIFT TO THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE IN A YEAR IN

WHICH THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY FALLS OF THAT DAY WHEN ON OUR CONTINENT THAT LAST SHOT OF THE TERRIBLE SECOND WORLD WAR WAS HEARD, WHICH TOOK MANY MILLIONS OF HUMAN LIVES AND LEFT HEAVY CONSEQUENCES FOR SEVERAL GENERATIONS.

2. THE PEOPLES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WHERE THE WORLD WAR IN EUROPE ENDED ON 9 MAY 1945, WILL REMEMBER WITH GRATITUDE THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE LIBERATION OF OUR COUNTRY BY THE SOVIET ARMY FROM THE FASCIST YOKE. AT THE SAME TIME, THIS ANNIVERSARY WILL BE AN IMPULSE FOR US THE NEW EFFORTS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF PEACE.

3. NOT TO PERMIT POSSIBILITIES FOR THE OUTBREAK OF A NEW WORLD CONFLICT, WHICH, IN OUR ERA, IN THE PRESENCE OF GIGANTIC MEANS OF MASS DESTRUCTION WOULD HAVE FATAL CONSEQUENCES FOR WORLD CIVILISATION - THIS IS THE PRINCIPAL LESSON OF THE LAST WAR. WE ARE SURE THAT ALL PEOPLES ASPIRE TO THIS AND THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO UNDERTAKE EVERY EFFORT SO THAT THE POSITIVE PROCESS OF THE WEAKENING OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION SHOULD BECOME IRREVERSIBLE AND THE DETERMINANT TREND IN OUR ERA.

4. IN THIS GENERAL ASPIRATION, THE QUESTION OF HALTING THE ARMS RACE AND OF DISARMAMENT, OF WHICH OUR TALKS ABOUT THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN EUROPE ALSO FORM AN INSEPARABLE PART, OCCUPIES AN IMPORTANT PLACE.

MR CHAIRMAN,

5. IT IS NOT FORTUITOUS THAT IN OUR TALKS THE THOUGHT HAS BEEN MANY TIMES EXPRESSED, THAT WE ARE OFFERED A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY AND THAT WE MUST NOT LET IT GO BY. IN OTHER WORDS - REGARDLESS OF THE SUBSTANTIAL DIVERGENCE IN POSITION, WE MUST REACH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE OF REDUCTIONS.
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THE GUIDANCE FOR THIS WAS JOINTLY WORKED OUT AND ACCEPTED IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS. IT IS OUR TASK TO FILL THESE IMPORTANT AGREED PRINCIPLES WITH CONCRETE CONTENT. AS TO THE FACT THAT THIS CONTENT MUST NOT RUN COUNTER TO THE PRINCIPLES TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED - ON THIS POINT, WE HOPE, THERE IS ALSO GENERAL UNDERSTANDING. THEREFORE, THE REAL VALUE OF EACH INDIVIDUAL PROPOSAL IS DETERMINED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPIRIT AND THE LETTER OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE. WE HAVE, AND CAN HAVE, NO OTHER OBJECTIVE YARDSTICK.

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6. THEREFORE EFFORTS TO GIVE SOME KIND OF "NEW" INTERPRETATION TO THE ALREADY AGREED SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS AND TO THE JOINTLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES CANNOT SERVE OUR CAUSE. THESE ARE EVEN VERY DANGEROUS TENDENCIES, FOR THEY DESTROY THAT BASIC FOUNDATION ON WHICH AN AGREEMENT CAN BE BUILT, WHICH WILL NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTY AND NOT ALLOW ANYONE TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES.

7. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES NOT ONLY DEFEND THESE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF OUR TALKS, BUT HAVE ALSO WORKED OUT THEIR COMPREHENSIVE DRAFT TREATY ON SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN STRICT CONFORMITY WITH THEM. PRECISELY FOR THIS
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REASON, THE PLAN OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IS A GOOD AND REALISTIC BASIS FOR THE TAKING OF CONCRETE DECISIONS. AND IT IS PRECISELY IN THIS THAT IT IS DIFFERENT IN PRINCIPLE FROM THE WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS WHICH ABOVE ALL SUFFERS FROM THE FACT THAT IT IS NOT CONNECTED TO THE PRINCIPLES REFERRED TO ABOVE. EVEN THE PARTIAL MODIFICATIONS OF THIS OUTLINE WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE BY WESTERN DELEGATIONS UP TO THIS TIME DO NOT ALTER THIS FACT, SINCE THEY DO NOT TOUCH ON THE VERY ESSENCE OF THE INADEQUACIES OF THE WESTERN REDUCTION PLAN.

8. IT IS WORTH AGAIN RECALLING THAT IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF 28 JUNE 1973, THE PARTICIPANTS "REACHED UNDERSTANDING THAT THE QUESTION OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD BE EXAMINED AT THE NEGOTIATIONS."

MR CHAIRMAN,

9. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT PRESENTED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES FULLY REFLECTS THE UNDERSTANDING THAT WAS REACHED ON THE SUBJECT OF THE TALKS. THIS PRECISE, CONCRETE PROGRAMME CLEARLY DEFINES THE GOAL OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH IS A SUBSTANTIAL - MORE THAN 15 PERCENT - MUTUAL REDUCTION IN THE COURSE OF THREE YEARS OF ALL TYPES OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA OF CENTRAL EUROPE.

10. THE WESTERN PLAN IGNORES THE MUTUALLY AGREED SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND REDUCES THE WHOLE QUESTION AND TASK OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS TO THE REDUCTION OF THE MANPOWER ALONE OF ONLY GROUND FORCES. THE CONSCIOUS OMISSION OF AIR FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, FROM THE WESTERN REDUCTION PLAN IS ONE OF THE CHIEF SHORTCOMINGS OF THIS SCHEME, FROM WHICH FLOW ALL ITS OTHER NEGATIVE ASPECTS, WHICH MAKE THIS PLAN UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. BY THIS WE HAVE IN MIND BOTH THE TWO-PHASE APPROACH AND THE IDEA OF ESTABLISHING "COMMON CEILINGS" ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF GROUND FORCES, WHICH, TAKEN TOGETHER, ARE DIRECTED AGAINST THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES AND AT OBTAINING UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES.

11. MOREOVER, THE RESTRICTION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONFIDENTIAL

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NEGOTIATIONS TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED CONTRADICTS THE REQUIREMENT FOR A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION, OF WHICH WE SO OFTEN HEAR OUR WESTERN COLLEAGUES SPEAK. WHAT RELLY SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION CAN BE IN QUESTION IF, FOR EXAMPLE, SO FEARSOME A WEAPON AS NUCLEAR WARHEADS WITH THE CORRESPONDING MEANS OF DELIVERY IS LEFT OUT?

12. OR, ON THE OTHER HAND, CAN ANYONE SERIOUSLY CLAIM THAT THE 15 PERCENT REDUCTION WHICH WE HAVE PROPOSED OF ALL TYPES OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IS NOT SUBSTANTIAL?

13. THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ORGANS IN THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO PROCEED TO SUCH A SUBSTANTIAL MUTUAL REDUCTION, WHICH WOULD NOT GIVE UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES TO ANYBODY, COULD NOT FAIL TO OCCASION CONCERN TO THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WITH RESPECT TO THE FURTHER COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

14. THE COMPROMISE PROPOSAL MADE ON 15 OCTOBER 1974 BY THE DELEGATIONS OF THE GDR, POLAND, THE USSR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION OF A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION IN 1975 OF AN INITIAL REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, WHICH WOULD NOT AFFECT THE BASIC POSITIONS OF THE SIDES AND WOULD NOT PREDETERMINE THE METHOD AND CONTEXT OF A FURTHER - MORE SUBSTANTIAL - REDUCTION, HAD AS ITS AIM TO ESTABLISH THE NECESSARY BASIS FOR WORKING OUT A FIRST MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. WE CAN ONLY REGRET THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE HITHERTO NOT RECOGNIZED THIS POSITIVE ASPECT OF THE PROPOSAL TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED, AND HAVE NOT EVEN ATTEMPTED TO WORK OUT JOINTLY ON THE BASIS OF THIS PROPOSAL AN AGREEMENT WHICH COULD BE AN IMPORTANT LANDMARK ON THE ROAD TO A FURTHER MORE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION.

15. THE FOUR SOCIALIST DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAVE TRIED TO FIND ADDITIONAL POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHERING PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND FOR CREATING CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD HELP PARTICIPANTS TO UNDERTAKE A SERIOUS SEARCH FOR A WAY OUT OF THE NOT VERY ENCOURAGING SITUATION IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS IN A CALMER ATMOSPHERE.

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16. FOR THIS REASON THEY MADE A PROPOSAL IN NOVEMBER LAST YEAR THAT THE DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES SHOULD ASSUME AN OBLIGATION IN A JOINT DECLARATION NOT TO INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE DURING THE PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS IMPORTANT AND AT THE SAME TIME SIMPLE PROPOSAL IS EVIDENT: ITS ACCEPTANCE WOULD PLACE A BARRIER IN THE WAY OF CONTINUING THE ARMS RACE IN THE AREA OF A FUTURE REDUCTION, WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON MILITARY DETENTE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND WOULD THUS CREATE A FAVOURABLE ATMOSPHERE FOR THE SEARCH FOR WAYS LEADING TO A REALLY SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

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17. ONE OF THE MERITS OF SUCH A PROPOSAL IS THAT IT IS NOT
LINKED WITH ANY OF THE BASIC REDUCTION PLANS OF EITHER SIDE,
AND HAS A REALLY NEUTRAL CHARACTER.

18. AGREEMENT ON SUCH A DECLARATION, WHICH IS SIMPLE IN ITS
FORM, WOULD NOT ONLY NOT DIVERT US FROM WORKING OUT MEASURES
FOR A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION, BUT WOULD ON THE CONTRARY FURTHER
A MOST SPEEDY REACHING OF DECISIONS ON SUBSTANTIAL
REDUCTIONS. IT DOES NOT STAND IN ISOLATION FROM THE WHOLE
REDUCTIONS PROCESS, BUT IS A LOGICAL STEP ON THE LADDER LEADING
TO REDUCTION. IN THE SITUATION IN WHICH OUR TALKS FIND
THEMSELVES, SUCH A JOINT EXPRESSION OF THE WILLINGNESS OF THE
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PARTICIPANTS NOT TO INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION AND NOT TO UNDERTAKE ANYTHING WHICH COULD HINDER THE ATTAINMENT OF SPECIFIC RESULTS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS IS A PRECONDITION OF FUTURE SUCCESS IN THE RESOLUTION OF OUR COMMON TASK.

19. ANY FEARS THAT SUCH AN OBLIGATION COULD HAVE ANY UNFAVOURABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SIDES ARE UNFOUNDED. AS WE HAVE EARLIER EXPLAINED IT DOES NOT PREJUDICE THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS AND, MOREOVER, IT INVOLVES AN OBLIGATION OF A TEMPORARY NATURE, WHICH WILL BE REPLACED BY SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS WORKED OUT IN THE COURSE OF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. IT FOLLOWS FROM ALL THIS THAT THE AIM OF THIS STEP IS TO STIMULATE NEGOTIATIONS ON A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION.

20. IT IS SOMETIMES SUGGESTED BY WESTERN DELEGATIONS IN THIS CONNECTION THAT A STEP SUCH AS A FREEZE ON THE MANPOWER OF FORCES CANNOT BE DISCUSSED INDEPENDENTLY AND THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO EXAMINE IT ONLY IN DIRECT CONNECTION WITH PROPOSALS ON REDUCTIONS. THE VERY WAY THAT THIS QUESTION IS PUT IS ILLOGICAL, SINCE NOBODY SEES A FREEZE AS A STEP COMPLETELY ISOLATED FROM REDUCTIONS. BUT THE QUESTION ARISES: WHAT CONNECTION IS AT ISSUE?

21. IF IT IS THE CONNECTION WHICH IS PROPOSED TO US IN THE MODIFICATIONS TO THE WESTERN PLAN OF REDUCTIONS, THEN IN THAT CASE NEITHER MORE NOR LESS IS BEING DEMANDED OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES THAN THAT THEY AGREE TO THE SATISFACTORY CARRYING OUT OF THE FIRST PHASE OF THE WESTERN SCHEME, WHICH IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THEM, AND TO THE EQUALLY UNACCEPTABLE AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH IS EXPRESSED IN THE CONCEPT OF "COMMON CEILINGS" ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. THAT IS THE PRICE THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE TO PAY FOR THE PROMISED OBLIGATION NOT TO INCREASE GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES OF THE WESTERN PLAN.

22. BY INSISTING ON SUCH A "LINK" BETWEEN REDUCTIONS AND A FREEZE, THE WEST IS IN EFFECT DELIBERATELY BLOCKING NOT ONLY A SOLUTION TO THE WESTION OF NOT INCREASING THE NUMERICAL

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STRENGTH OF FORCES, BUT ALSO PROGRESS TOWARDS SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS.

23. IN FACT IT TURNS OUT THAT THE WEST SEES A POSSIBILITY FOR RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF NOT INCREASING FORCE MANPOWER NOT IN ANY OTHER CONNECTION WITH REDUCTIONS, BUT ONLY IN A CONNECTION THAT WOULD MAKE A "FREEZE" AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE REDUCTION OF A LIMITED CHARACTER ENVISAGED IN THE WESTERN TWO-PHASE SCHEME.

24. IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID, THE UNBIASED CHARACTER OF OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE ADOPTION OF A JOINT DECLARATION STANDS OUT STILL MORE SHARPLY AND WE AGAIN CALL ON THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO ADOPT A CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION IN CONNECTION WITH THIS INITIATIVE.

MR CHAIRMAN,

25. IN THE COURSE OF THE LAST FEW MONTHS, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE MADE MANY EFFORTS TO HELP FIND A WAY THAT WOULD LEAD TO FIRST MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. WE HAVE BUILT TWO SOLID BRIDGES, WHICH ARE INTENDED TO OVERCOME THE DISTANCE WHICH STILL SEPARATES THE BASIC POSITION OF THE TWO SIDES. WE CAN MOVE FORWARD IN PARALLEL ALONG THESE BRIDGES TOWARDS SOLUTIONS DIRECTED TOWARDS A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

26. ALLOW ME TO ASSURE YOU AND ALL THOSE PRESENT THAT THE CZECHOSLOVAK DELEGATION WILL CONTINUE TO ASSIST IN THE SEARCH FOR CONCRETE, MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS AND TO WORK FOR THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE RESULTS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

END TEXT.DEAN

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